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1. INTRODUCTION
Business R&D is a key indicator of the innovation performance of a country. In many
situations, without government intervention, the business sector would not invest the R&D amount
that corresponds to the socially optimal level. Financial markets imperfections, informational
asymmetries and positive R&D spillovers are market failures that can lead the business sector to
under-invest in R&D. The inability of R&D investors to capture all the benefits of their investment
are responsible for this underinvestment in R&D. Most countries have decided to correct for the
presence of market failures by  supporting business-funded R&D via direct grants, tax incentives or
a mixture of the two approaches.  
There is a considerable body of international experience with all types of instruments used
to support business R&D. The arguments in favor of one or the other policy measure generally are
based on evidence from factual situations in a specific country or industrial context. There exist a
number of studies that have formally examined the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives or direct
support measures (see the surveys by David, Hall and Poole (2000) and Hall and van Reenen
(2000)). A few studies on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives have been made using Canadian
data: McFetridge and Warda (1983), Mansfield and Switzer (1985), Bernstein (1986), Dagenais,
Mohnen, Therrien  (1997), Dahlby (2005), and Czarnitzki, Hanel and Rosa (2005). The latest
Canadian studies (e.g. Dahlby, 2005; Dagenais et al., 1997) indicate that tax incentives stimulate
R&D activity between $0.98 and $1.38 per dollar of foregone tax expenditure (excluding possible
provincial tax incentives) and that R&D tax credits have a positive impact on the firm’s decision to
conduct R&D and to increase innovation output (Czarnitzki et al. (2005)). Only one study to our
knowledge (Pagé, 1995) has formally examined the effectiveness of direct government support for
innovation in Canada.
The debate is still going on. On the one hand, tax incentives are provided to encourage the
broadest range of firms to engage in R&D. They have an administrative cost (OECD, 2002) and are
neutral with respect to the choice of industry and the nature of the firm (Czarnitzki et al., 2005). On
the other hand, more direct support (like grants) is provided to individual firms for promising R&D
projects, and their effects can be better measured than those from fiscal indirect support (OECD,
2002). Direct support or subsidies allow government to retain control over the type of R&D and to
promote mission objectives (OECD, 2002). They are neutral with respect to the business tax
structure and they usually focus on projects with a higher social rate of return.
We shall not draw an exhaustive list of pros and cons. In any case, a review of the existing
literature suggests that it is not possible to conclude in favour of one instrument over the other, at
least, not in an obvious way. We used micro data from the 2005 Canadian Innovation Survey to
examine whether firms that receive R&D grants in addition to R&D tax credits perform any better
in terms of various innovation output measures than firms that receive only R&D tax credits.
 Section 2 of the paper presents the data used and the characteristics of the survey. We split
our sample into two groups: firms that claimed tax credits only and firms that claimed tax credits and
received R&D grants. Section 3 reviews and discusses important aspects of the matching estimators
method. In section 4 we present the characteristics of both groups before the matching process
1 For more details on the methodology of the survey see the Statcan website:
http://www.statcan.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=4218&lang=en&db=IMDB&
dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2
2 North American Industry Classification System, Statistics Canada, 2002. Manufacturing (NAICS 31-33),
Logging (NAICS 1133).
3 Our sample also includes less than 0.2% of logging industries (NAICS 1133).
4 Innovating firms are defined as firms that report having introduced either a new product or a new process
during the 2002-2004 time period.
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occurs. Section 5 discusses the results of the weighted logistic model that was used to compute the
propensity scores. In section 6 we briefly present the characteristics of both groups, this time after
the matching process has occurred. After matching, both groups have the same characteristics and
the difference in output variables is then attributable to the policy incentives considered. This section
also presents the results for the innovators subsample.
2. DATA
2.1 The Survey1
This study uses the 2005 Survey of Innovation from Statistics Canada1. The survey collects
information on new and significantly improved products and processes introduced during the period
2002-2004. The target population includes all establishments in the manufacturing sector2 and
logging2 with at least 20 employees and $250,000 in revenues. The overall response rate for the
survey was 71.9%, for a total of 6,143 completed questionnaires. The sampling weights of the
respondent population were adjusted for non-responses.
2.2 The sample
From the 6,143 completed questionnaires, 2,200 establishments reported using R&D tax
credits without receiving any R&D grants. 585 establishments reported using both types of programs,
while 66 used government R&D grants without using tax credit programs, and 3,292 used neither
program. Given the very small number of establishments that used only direct grants programs, we
restricted our analysis to those 2,200 establishments that used tax credits only and those 585 that
used both programs. The 3,292 establishments that did not use any programs are out of the scope of
this analysis.
Our sample is a cross-section of 2,785 manufacturing3 plants that used R&D support
programs sponsored by both the federal and provincial governments. We also conduct the analysis
on innovators4 only, in which case our  sample reduces to 2,468 establishments, of which 536 use
both programs.
2We use normalized survey weights (Binder 1983) throughout the analysis, giving us
population figures rather than sample results. The inferences using conventional software with
normalized weights may be valid when the assumed model is true, but they are not robust to model
misspecification (Binder and Roberts, 2006). For confidence intervals and statistical tests of
significance, estimates that take into account the unequal probabilities of selection in the sample
design were computed to ensure the validity of results.
3. MATCHING ESTIMATOR FRAMEWORK
We want to estimate the average effect on various innovation measures of receiving an R&D
grant in the presence of R&D tax credits. Therefore we distinguish two groups of firms, those
claiming tax credits and receiving an R&D grant (BTG=1) and those claiming tax credits and
receiving no R&D grant (BTG=0). In this paper, we will often refer to the first group as the group
using two policy instruments (claiming tax credits and receiving a grant). The treatment will also
refer to claiming tax credits and receiving a grant (BTG=1).
Let Yi(0) be the outcome of firm i if it claims only tax credits and Yi(1) be the outcome of
the same firm when it claims tax credits and receives an R&D grant. Obviously, both outcomes are
not observable for the same firm. But, if they were observable, the effect of using both instruments
instead of just one for a firm i that receives the treatment (i.e. that enjoys both R&D support
measures) would be E[Yi(1)-Yi(0)| BTG=1]. The so called Sample Average Treatment Effect on the
Treated (SATT) would be estimated by:
 
   
   (1)
N1 being the number of treated units.
      
An issue in our case is that only one of the two outcomes is observed for a specific firm i.
Unlike controlled randomized studies, ordinary observational data do not provide counterparts for
the missing counterfactual. As only one outcome is observed for each firm, it is not possible to
calculate directly the individual gains (or loss) from using both instruments. The problem, therefore,
is a missing data problem (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997). Suppose we observe Yi(1). We
could ask what would have been firm i’s output Y if it had not used both instruments? Estimating
the untreated outcome Yi(0) for firm i which was exposed to the treatment (BTG=1) could be a
solution. If the decision to receive the treatment (BTG=1) would have been purely random for firms
having similar characteristics, then we could simply use the average outcome of similar firms which
were not exposed to the treatment. This is the idea behind matching estimators. For each firm i,
matching estimators associate the missing outcome by finding another firm whose covariates X are
similar but who were exposed to the other treatment. Obviously two assumptions are needed to
obtain consistent and valid estimation of the average treatment effect.
3Assumptions: 
(i) Unconfoundedness: BTG is independent of [Y(1),Y(0)] conditional on X=x
(ii) Common support: c < Pr(BTG=1 | X=x ) < 1-c, for some c > 0 and all x in X
Condition (i) states that assignment of the treatment BTG is independent of the outcomes
conditional on the covariates X. Condition (ii) states that we must have an overlap between those
that received the treatment and those that did not. Under these assumptions, we can then rewrite
equation (1) as the mean difference of the matched samples:
   (2)
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable differences between
treated and non-treated firms. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) point out that for identification
of equation (2), assumption (i) can be weakened to mean independence. The process of matching
then consists of picking for each treated firm the most similar firm within the non-treated sample.
Different types of matching estimators exist, with various properties. It is important to keep
in mind that causal questions from nonrandomized studies can only adjust for observed confounding
covariates and not unobserved ones. While research and refinements in econometric techniques are
always evolving, this is always a limitation of nonrandomized studies relative to controlled
randomized studies.
The average treatment effect is traditionally measured using covariates adjustment and
various matching algorithms (parametric and non parametric) to reduce the possible bias in the
average treatment effect (e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Abadie and Imbens, 2006). The
propensity score, defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment (BTG=1) versus
another treatment (BTG=0) given the characteristics (covariates) X of participants, Pr(BTG=1 |X=x),
was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Lechner (1998) suggested a hybrid matching,
where the propensity score and a subset of X is used in the matching process. However, in some
situations these methods are not adequate and may lead to inefficient estimates of the treatment
effect. Abadie and Imbens (2006) have shown that using more than a single continuous covariate for
matching may result in a matching discrepancy of stochastic order N-1/K (K being the number of
continuous matching variables and N being the number of observations to match). When K=1, the
bias term can be ignored and the matching estimator is %N-consistent. The choice of a single
continuous covariate, such as the propensity score, for matching becomes critical.
We use matched pairing which consists of sampling from potential firms in group BTG=0
for which the distribution of covariates X are similar to those in group BTG=1. More specifically
5 The Mahalanobis distance is a measure based on correlation between variables and can be expressed as
MD(K,L)=(K-L)tO -1(K-L) where K and L are two N-dimensional points from the same distribution with
covariance matrix O.
6 The results presented in this paper do not allow different treated firms to be matched to the same
non-treated firm. To allow matching with replacement may introduce a bias in statistical tests.
Mahalanobis distance is the criterion used to get a unique match. Remaining treated firms that were
matched to the same non-treated firm after a full cycle have to be rematched until all treated firms are
uniquely matched.
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we use the nearest neighbour Mahalanobis5 metric matching defined on the propensity score. The
matching scheme is illustrated in Chart 1 and can be summarized by the following matching
algorithm steps:
Step1 Define a logistic model with all possible independent variables that may have affected the
choice of treatment BTG and compute the propensity scores (that is the estimated probability
of obtaining a tax credit and a grant).
Step 2 Create two groups. One is the treated group where BTG=1 and the other is the non-treated
group BTG=0 (usually the larger one) where all firms are considered a potential match.
Step 3  Choose one observation to match from the group BTG=1. Firms in group BTG=0 for which
propensity scores are within one quarter of a standard deviation of the chosen observation
propensity score are retained as potential candidates for matching. 
Step 4 Three situations may happen from the previous step: (1) No candidate is located, the chosen
observation won’t be matched. Go back to Step 3. (2) Only one candidate is found and the
match is retained for this observation. Go back to Step 3. (3) More than one candidate is
found. Use the Mahalanobis distance in Step 5 to find the best match.
Step 5 Mahalanobis distances based on propensity scores and a small number of key variables are
calculated between the observation to match, and the pool of potential candidates found in
step 3. The firm in this pool with the smallest distance to the observation to match is selected
and retained as a match.
Step 6 The matching process will repeat at Step 3 until all firms in the group BTG=1 have been
matched. Matched candidates in Steps 4 or 5 from BTG=0 are never removed from the
matching consideration in Step 36.
         
5Chart 1
We transformed the propensity scores and key variables selected in Step 5 into standardized
variables having an identity variance-covariance matrix. The Mahalanobis distance for data points
before standardization will be identical to the Euclidean distance for data points in the standardized
space. Specifically, we used SAS procedure PROC PRINCOMP and PROC SCORE to obtain the
principal components scores with an identity variance-covariance matrix and PROC FASTCLUS
to compute Euclidean distances from the pool of potential candidates and the reference point selected
in Step 3. If one had used only the propensity score in Step 5, transformations are unnecessary to
obtain an identity variance-covariance matrix and the Euclidean distance applied to original data is
sufficient.
64. BEFORE MATCHING
4.1 Control variables
We used many observed confounding covariates to find which ones had an effect on the
decision to use only R&D tax credits versus using both R&D tax credits and grants. Of course, we
could only take into account variables included in the survey. Our two groups already showed more
homogeneity than if we were comparing a group receiving government support to a group receiving
none. Because of the homogeneous nature of our two groups, we believe that unobserved variables
are also of comparable magnitude. Moreover, we consider that key variables were available in the
survey to help us identify important firm characteristics in light of their decision to choose one or
two instruments.
Table 1 describes the relevant characteristics of the treated (BTG=1) and non-treated
establishments (BTG=0) before matching. For continuous variables the p-values pertain to a  t-test
on mean difference. For categorical variables, the p-values are based on the Chi-Square test of
independence, testing whether distributions of categorical variables differ from one another.
7Table 1*: Means and proportions of relevant characteristics before matching
Characteristics Tax Credits only
(N=2200)
Tax credits + R& D grants
(N=585)
P-Value
Lnemp 4.3346 4.2499 0.0669
Mean of predicted
probabilities
0.1786 0.2317 <0.0001
Atlantic Region 3.63 % 5.70 % 0.0298
Quebec Region 36.37 % 42.11 % 0.0145
Ontario Region 43.89 % 33.68 % <0.0001
Western Region 16.10 % 18.51 % 0.1806
Resources Ind. 24.50 % 23.78 % 0.7315
Labour Ind. 24.15 % 27.75 % 0.0851
Scale Ind. 24.45 % 19.44 % 0.0148
Specialized Ind. 18.69 % 15.04 % 0.0502
Science Ind. 7.52 % 13.13 % <0.0001
Niche 37.06 % 44.89 % 0.0009
New Ind. Standards 10.63 % 17.10 % <0.0001
Environment 34.10 % 37.22 % 0.1761
Applied for patents 21.39 % 31.93 % <0.0001
Outsourcing R&D 20.65 % 31.26 % <0.0001
External funding 48.45 % 61.46 % <0.0001
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
Before matching, most variables showed differences between both groups at the 1%
significance level. To control for firm size, we used the number of employees specified in natural
logarithms (Lnemp). As expected, due to the homogeneity of our two groups, the difference in firm
size is not significant at the 5% level. The group which used tax credits and grants has about 70
employees on average while the group which used tax credits only has 76 employees on average. The
literature shows that firm size is an important characteristic regarding R&D expenditures and
innovation activities. However, since our two groups are already performing R&D, we did not expect
firm size to have strong explanatory power.
Geography was another important characteristic to consider as provincial R&D incentives
differ. Any help and services offered to get an R&D grant might be different from one province to
8another. To control for this aspect, we considered four regions in our analysis (represented as
dummies in the logistic regression): Atlantic region, Quebec region, Ontario region and Western
region. Table 1 shows that our two samples are not balanced with respect to geographic
characteristics. As an example, firms from Quebec are significantly (at the 5% level) more
represented in the group that received both tax credits and grants (BTG=1) than in the group that
only claimed tax credits (BTG=0). Firms in Ontario are significantly (at 1% level) more represented
in the group that claimed tax credits only (BTG=0).
Sectoral patterns in the production of innovations are well known. It would not be acceptable,
for example, to match a firm specialized in textile products with a firm specialized in computer
equipment. We tried various taxonomies of industries including the OECD definition based on the
level of technology. After a few tests, we concluded that a definition based on Pavitt (1984)
taxonomy was the most appropriate. Pavitt (1984) classified sectoral patterns of innovation into three
sectors. The sectors were later increased or reclassified into five sectors (see appendix 1): The
supplier dominated category was broken into Resources and Labour; The production intensive was
defined as Scale-intensive and Specialized suppliers; and the Science-based remained a single
category. Firms in the supplier dominated category are traditionally characterized as having a low
to medium-low technology orientation. Innovation therefore is dependent on external factors, such
as suppliers of equipment and materials. Firms in the scale intensive sector have some in-house
development capability. They interact mostly with specialized supplier firms where the level of
technology is higher. In the science-based sector, the main source of innovation is in-house
development. Table 1 indicates that science based firms (e.g. computer equipment manufacturing)
were significantly (at 1% level) more represented in the group that received both tax credits and
grants (BTG=1), while scale intensive firms (like pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing) were
significantly less represented in that group (at 5% level) .
The survey asked plants to rate the importance of some success factors according to a scale
(High, Medium, Low and not relevant). Factors of success can be an important aspect in a firm’s
decision to undertake R&D. They can also affect firms’ decisions to claim tax credits and/or grants.
For example a firm might need to comply with environmental standards which makes it a good
candidate to apply for a special grant. Outcomes can also be affected by success factors. For
example, firms developing new industry standards might be more innovative than others. Only three
factors from all success factors were included in the logistic regression. We defined a dummy named
Niche when a firm reported a high degree of importance for developing niche or specialized markets.
New Ind. Standards is a dummy indicating that the firm gives a high degree of importance to active
involvement in developing new industry-wide standards. And finally, the dummy Enviro is equal
to one when the firm declared a high degree of importance in its ability to comply with
environmental standards and regulations. The two first dummies are not “balanced” between our two
groups while we cannot say that there is a significant difference between both groups concerning the
Enviro dummy.
9We considered three other variables as determinants in how firms organize their innovation
activities. Firms that applied for patents might be more organized and have more experience in
filling paperwork. Claiming a tax credit is usually less constraining than applying for a grant. For
the same reason, firms that outsourced R&D are more likely to be well organized. They are usually
larger firms familiar with negotiating contracts and filing paperwork. External funding also seems
to be a key variable when choosing governmental programs. Firms that applied for patents,
outsourced R&D or received external funding are proportionally more represented in the category
“tax credits and grants” than in the category “tax credits only”.
More variables were considered as control variables but were not significant in the logistic
regression. Some variables were highly correlated and we had to choose between them to avoid
strong dependence (multicollinearity). For example, the percentage of employees working in R&D
was negatively correlated with the total number of employees. When one variable was included in
the regression, the other became non-significant while the other covariates remained basically the
same. The percentage of  employees with a university degree was positively correlated with the
industry of science and the percentage of employees in R&D. We verified that the choice of one or
the other variable did not change the results after the matching process.
Table 1 shows that the two sub-samples, while not totally heterogeneous, are not balanced.
For example, we cannot say the mean number of employees is different at the 5% level, but some
geographic characteristics are very different, even at the 1% level. After the matching process, all
controlling variables should no longer be statistically different. The mean of predicted probabilities
of assignment to the target or the control group should also be the same between the two samples.
4.2 Outcome variables (before matching)
We used three types of outcomes variables. The first type considers the nature of innovations.
We want to know whether firms that used tax credits and grants instead of only tax credits were
sometimes first to innovate. We created four dummies indicating the following: World First if the
firm introduced a world-first innovation; North A. First for a North American first innovation; and
Canadian First and Province First for Canadian and Provincial first innovations.
The second type of outcome variables considered the number of new or significantly
improved products. We defined two variables: New innovation > 0 and New innovation > 2. 
The last type of outcome variables considered the economic success of the newly introduced
products. The products can be a first-to-market product or an already-on-the-market-product. Both
variables % Rev. first-to-market > 0 and % Rev. already-on-market > 0 measure whether the new
or significantly improved products had an important share of the firms revenues.
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Table 2 shows that, except for the percentage of revenue from already-on-the-market product
innovation, the outcome variables are different between the two groups. But these differences might
simply be explained by the different characteristics of firms in the two groups and not by the public
policy incentive schemes. We cannot compare directly the means or proportions of our two groups
because of this potential sample selection bias. The matching process will make an adjustment to
correct this potential problem. If the outcome variables differ significantly after the matching, we
will be able to assign the differences to the policy incentives considered.
Table 2*: Proportions of relevant outcome measures before matching
Outcome variables Tax Credits only
(N=2200)
Tax credits + R& D grants
(N=585)
P-Value
Province First 52.89% 64.80% <0.0001
Canadian First 41.41% 53.01% <0.0001
North A. First 27.24% 38.24% <0.0001
World First 13.24% 25.26% <0.0001
New innovation > 0 70.11% 80.49% <0.0001
New innovation > 2 52.95% 64.75% <0.0001
% Rev. First-to-market > 0 48.86% 60.84% <0.0001
% Rev. Already-on-market > 0 40.71% 43.96% 0.1727
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
5. MATCHING
As mentioned in section 3, we defined a logistic model including all the control variables that
had an effect on the decision to use tax credits and grants. The propensity scores are estimated using
the results of the logistic regression presented in Table 3.
For nearly all variables, the probability of using tax credits and grants relative to only tax
credits is positive. This means, for example, that given all other variables, firms in Quebec, Atlantic
or the Western region compared to firms in the Ontario region have more chances of claiming tax
credits and receiving a grant than claiming only tax credits. Some regional aspects can explain this
result. For example, there are more firms in Quebec than in Ontario offering services to help build
cases in order to apply for a grant. The Ontario region was taken as the reference region.  Picking
another region as reference would not have changed the propensity scores.
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It seems the size of the firm (measured by employment) is not as important as the geographic
aspect for receiving tax credits only and tax credits with grants. The negative sign of the variable
tends to suggest that the bigger the firm the less chance it has to apply for  tax credits and grants. But,
it is significant only at the10% level. The literature clearly states that the larger the firm is, the more
likely it will use government support for R&D. When choosing between instruments the size of the
firm doesn’t appear to matter as much.
Sectoral patterns in the production of innovation are also significant, especially for science-
based industries. Science-based industries (when compared to scale-intensive) are more likely to use
tax credits and grants than tax credits only. Actually science-based industries are more likely to use
tax credits and grants than any other type of industry used in our taxonomy. It then becomes very
important to have balanced samples with respect to this variable. It would certainly not be desirable
to match a science-based firm with another firm from a different sector.  As for geographic variables,
the scale-intensive variable was picked as reference. Again, this choice was arbitrary and has no
influence on the propensity scores calculation.
Firms developing niche or specialized markets, as well as firms developing new industry-
wide standards, are more likely to claim tax credits and receive grants. Firms which are highly
concerned about the ability to comply with environmental standards and regulations are also more
likely to use both instruments (significant at 5%).
Three other characteristics are important in being classified in the group of firms that receives
both  tax credits and grants: applying for a patent, outsourcing R&D, or receiving external funding
(excluding governmental support). These three characteristics are strongly significant (at a 1% level).
Ideally, we certainly do not want to match a firm which applied for a patent with a firm that did not.
In fact, we do not want this to happen on average. In other words, we do not want the matching
process to give us an overrepresentation of these characteristics and introduce a bias in one of our
two groups. For example, if the application for a patent is correlated with the number of innovations,
a group with more firms that applied for a patent would falsely lead us to conclude that firms using
tax credits and grants are more innovative.  
12
Table 3: Weighted logit model on the tax credits and grants dummy
Variables Estimate P-value
Intercept -2.3283 <0.0001
Ln Employment -0.097 0.0792
Atlantic Region 0.7841 0.0009
Quebec Region 0.4266 0.0003
Ontario Region *Reference *Ref.
Western Region 0.4981 0.0007
Resources Ind. 0.2645 0.0851
Labour Ind. 0.3345 0.0221
Scale Ind. *Reference *Ref.
Specialized Ind. 0.0398 0.8137
Science Ind. 0.6962 0.0002
Niche 0.2447 0.0168
New ind. Standards 0.5257 0.0003
Enviro. 0.2161 0.0499
Applied for patents 0.5313 <0.0001
Outsourcing R&D 0.4336 0.0001
External funding 0.4778 <0.0001
Number of observations : 2785
Likelihood Ratio test: P2=140.1629   Pr > ChiSq  <0.0001
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
6. AFTER MATCHING
6.1 Control variables
Table 4 describes the matched samples and shows the relevant characteristics of the treated
(BTG=1) and non-treated (BTG=0). Using the algorithm described in section 3, we succeeded in
matching 584 firms out of 585. The variables used for matching were the propensity score, Quebec
region, Ontario region, Science-based and Scale-intensive industries, as well as outsourced R&D.
The difference between the matched pairs is evaluated using a t-test for the continuous variable and
a Chi-square for the categorical variables. The mean of predicted probabilities and all control
variables after matching showed no significant differences between the two groups. This shows that
the two matched groups are well balanced. Because of this, the differences in outcome variables are
not the result of differences in firm characteristics between the two groups.
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Table 4*: Mean and proportions of relevant characteristics after matching
Characteristics Tax Credits only
(N=584)
Tax credits + R&D
grants (N=584)
P-Value
Mean of natural log. of
employment
4.2691 4.2503 0.737
Mean of predicted
probabilities
0.2288 0.2311 0.7
Atlantic Region 5.48% 5.71% 0.873
Quebec Region 44.86% 42.16% 0.3849
Ontario Region 33.70% 33.72% 0.9928
Western Region 15.97% 18.41% 0.3019
Resources Ind. 23.61% 23.81% 0.9401
Labour Ind. 25.41% 28.63% 0.2468
Scale Ind. 20.98% 19.47% 0.5465
Specialized Ind. 16.56% 15.06% 0.5104
Science Ind. 13.43% 13.02% 0.8492
Niche 45.28% 44.82% 0.8828
New Ind. Standards 16.80% 16.99% 0.9348
Environment 38.10% 37.15% 0.7525
Applied for patents 32.45% 31.84% 0.8343
Outsourcing R&D 30.19% 31.18% 0.7314
External funding 61.18% 61.42% 0.9371
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
6.2 Outcome variables (after matching)
Table 5 can be used to estimate the effect of using tax credits and grants instead of tax
credits only on the outcome variables. The differences between our two groups can now be
interpreted as the result of receiving the treatment and not as differences in firms characteristics. As
in Table 2 (before matching), outcome variables are almost all significantly different between our
two groups. As expected once the two groups are balanced in firm characteristics, the differences
in outcome variables are not as large.
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Table 5*: Proportions of relevant outcome measures after matching
Outcome variables Tax Credits only
(N=584)
Tax credits + R&D
grants (N=584)
P-Value
Province first 58.84% 64.75% 0.0819
Canadian first 47.84% 52.96% 0.1068
North A. First 31.4% 38.17% 0.0598
World first 17.24% 25.29% 0.0046
New innovation > 0 71.80% 80.47% 0.0011
New innovation > 2 50.86% 64.70% <0.0001
% Rev. First-to-market > 0 52.49% 60.79% 0.0074
% Rev. Already-on-market > 0 40.13% 44.02% 0.2086
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
In the first type of outcome variable, considering the nature of innovations, firms that used
tax credits and grants instead of just tax credits are clearly favoured. At the 1% level significance
level, 25.29% of the firms which used both instruments made a world first innovation during the
three years considered, against only 17.24% among those that used tax credits only. This is a very
important result as we know that world first innovations have more chances to enjoy commercial
success. The impact on the Canadian economy is therefore usually much larger. North-American
and province first innovations also were more frequent among firms that used both instruments:
38.17% of firms using both instruments made North American first innovations against only 31.4%
among firms using tax credits only. For province-first innovations, the proportions are 64.75%
compared to 58.84% for firms that used tax credits only. These difference are significant at the 10%
level. At the same level of significance, we cannot conclude that Canadian-first innovations are
performed in a larger proportion for firms using both instruments.
The second type of outcome variables, which measure the number of new or significantly
improved products, are even more conclusive. 80.47% of the firms that used both instruments made
at least one innovation during the period considered, while 71.8% did so among the firms that used
tax credits only. The difference between the two groups is even larger when we consider firms that
made three innovations or more (New innovation >2). 64.7% of the firms that used both instruments
made three innovations or more and only  50.86%within the other group. We looked at firms
producing even more innovations and every time firms that used both instruments performed better
than firms that used tax credits only. Of course, we have no information on the economic value nor
on the returns to establishments from these innovations. But we have no reason to believe that, on
average, they are different between groups.
7 The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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The economic success of newly introduced products, measured by the percentage of revenue
from first-to-market or already-on-market innovations, provided the expected results. A firm which
develops a first-to-market innovation generally has an economic advantage over a firm that develops
an already-on-market innovation. Usually a higher percentage of a firm’s revenue coming from first-
to-market products gives an indication of higher success in commercializing the innovation product.
60.79% of firms that claimed tax credits and received grants reported to have at least some
commercial success (i.e. more than 0% as a share of revenues). Only 52.49% of the firms that
claimed only tax credits reported the same. We still get similar results if we look at firms that
reported to have some percentage of their revenue coming from first-to-market innovation. For
example, 52.8% of the firms using both instruments, compared to 38.8% of the firms using tax
credits only, declared a percentage of revenue above 3% due to  first-to-market innovations.
An interesting result also comes from the fact that the percentage of sales from already-on-
the-market products are not significantly different between our two groups. Using tax credits and
grants instead of tax credits only seems to make a significant difference when commercializing
innovation in immature markets, but it does not seem to make a significant difference in established
markets.
6.3 Innovators’ subsample
We also conducted the analysis on innovators only. This reduced our sample to 2,468
establishments of which 536 used both instruments. Using the same algorithm as for the full sample,
we succeeded in matching 533 firms out of 536. Because we had no reason to believe that the
control variables should have been exactly the same as in the full sample, we tried for various
control variables again. After several experiments with different covariates, we concluded  that the
innovators subsample shared very similar characteristics with the full sample. The computation of
the propensity score was then done with the same controlling variables as in the full sample. We do
not present the logistic regression results for the subsample, as they are very similar to Table 37. As
in the full sample, the controlling variables are different between our two groups before matching
and not different after matching.
Table 6 shows the effect of using tax credits and grants instead of just tax credits on the
outcome variables for the innovators subsample. As in Table 5, the differences between our two
groups can be interpreted as the result of using two instruments instead of one and not as differences
in firms characteristics.
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Table 6*: Proportions of relevant outcome measures after matching (innovators subsample)
Outcome variables Tax Credits only
(N=533)
Tax credits + R&D
grants (N=533)
P-Value
Province First 63.00% 69.95% 0.0618
Canadian First 48.81% 57.14% 0.0162
North A. First 34.30% 41.35% 0.0638
World First 17.10% 27.36% 0.0007
New innovation > 0 75.98% 87.03% <0.0001
New innovation > 2 57.90% 69.90% 0.0001
% Rev. First-to-market > 0 52.4% 65.65% <0.0001
% Rev. Already-on-market > 0 46.42% 47.43% 0.7548
*Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, authors’ calculations.
The results for innovators are similar to the full sample results except for firms which
declared their innovation a first in Canada. The difference between firms using both instruments and
firms using tax credits only was not significant when considering “Canadian-first” innovation. For
the innovators, at a 5% level of significance, 57.14% of firms that used tax credits and grants
declared a “Canadian-first” innovation against 48.81% of firms that used tax credits only. For most
other outcome variables, the differences between our two groups are even wider than in the full
sample. There are two exceptions though.
 First, the difference between our two groups for firms that had made at least 3 innovations
( New innovation > 2) is not as large for the innovators subsample. The difference between our two
groups for the full sample was 13.84 percentage points while it was 12 percentage points for the
innovators’ subsample. The difference is still large and significant enough (1% level) to conclude
that firms using tax credits and grants performed better than firms using tax credits only. We also
tested for firms producing even more innovations. In each case, firms that used both instruments
performed better than firms that used tax credits only. For example, 38.85% of the firms that used
tax credits and grants made at least 7 innovations while only 32.46% did the same in the other
group. The difference is significant at the 5% level.
Second, the difference between our two groups for the percentage of revenue from already-
on-the market innovations, is greatly reduced. The difference was already not significant in the full
sample, but it is even less so in the innovators’ subsample.  This means that R&D grants  make no
difference for innovators when it comes to commercialize their innovation in mature markets. It is
clearly not the case in immature markets. 22.28% of the firms that claimed tax credits and received
grants declared that at least 20% of their revenues came from first-to-market innovations. Only
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17.05% of firms that claimed tax credits only declared the same. Table 6 shows that there is also
a smaller proportion  (52.4%) among the firms that claimed tax credits only which declared a
positive share of revenues from first-to-market innovation.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper looked at the effectiveness of R&D grants by comparing innovation performance
measures for firms that received R&D tax credits only and firms that received both  R&D tax credits
and R&D grants. To our knowledge, this is the first Canadian study using micro data to measure the
effectiveness of direct grants on innovation and correcting for the endogeneity of policy treatment.
We find that using tax credits and grants is more effective than using tax credits only. In
other words, firms that benefitted from both policy measures were significantly more innovative
than their counterparts that only benefitted from R&D tax incentives. Firms that received R&D
grants in addition to enjoying R&D tax credits not only introduced more innovations but made more
world-first innovations and were more successful in commercializing their innovations. The R&D
grants program stimulates in particular world-first innovations and not so much products already
known in Canada. World-first innovations are more likely to produce externalities and therefore we
can claim that the R&D grants program stimulates innovation precisely in areas where the market
failure is highest.
We obtained very similar results when we considered innovators only. We again found that
firms that received both R&D tax credits and R&D grants had more innovations, more “world-first”
innovations, and a greater share of having their revenue come from first-to-market innovations than
firms that received only R&D tax credits.
Unfortunately the amount (level) of governmental support for both tax credit and grant
programs were not available in the survey. Because of this lack of information, this study cannot
shed light on the efficiency of tax credit versus direct grants. Future research could make sure that
the same amount of support is available to both groups. Another aspect concerns the value of
innovations for which no data exist. It is possible that grant programs have more impact on the value
of innovation because of its inherent capacity to choose promising project.
18
Appendix 1: Sectoral Pattern Taxonomy
Pavitt Taxonomy NAICS
Code
Description
Resource-intensive
311 Food M anufacturing
312 Beverage and T obacco Product Manufacturing
321 Wood Product Manufacturing
322 Paper M anufacturing
324 Petroleum and Coal Product Manufacturing
327 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
Labour-intensive
313 Textile Mills
314 Textile Product Mills
315 Clothing Manufacturing
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
332 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
337 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Scale-intensive
323 Printing and Related Support Activities
325 Chemical Manufacturing
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing
3361 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing
3362 Motor Vehicle Body and T railer Manufacturing
3363 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing
3365 Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
3366 Ship and Boat Building
3369 Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
Science-Based
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
3364 Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing
Specialized 333 Machinery Manufacturing
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance and Component Manufacturing
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